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NOT SO HARD (AND NOT SO SPECIAL), AFTER ALL: 
COMMENTS ON ZIMRING'S "THE HARDEST OF THE 
HARD CASES' ' 
Stephen J. Morse ' 
T he main theme of Frank Zimring 's interest ing and provoca-
ti ve essay is that analysis of the culpability and appropriate pun-
ishment of adolescent killers requires a "series of factual and legal 
inquiries as subtle, as problematic. and as controve rsial as can be 
found in the modern criminal law of personal violence." 1 He as-
serts correctly that the justice system has failed utterly to confront 
adolescent culpability systematically and that transfer of an ado-
lescent killer to criminal court does not resolve the issues. He ac-
cu rately claims that we lack the principles that should govern an 
appropriate response to an adolescent killing, whether the adjudi-
cation occurs in juvenile or criminal court. Professor Z imring pro-
poses that retributive punishment may be an appropri ate compo-
nent of the law's response when mid to late adolescents commit 
crimes as serious as homicide, but he believes that consideration 
of immaturity and diminished responsibility provides the best 
means to treat adolescent killers justly. 
This Comment begins with the assertion that it is impossible to 
think sensibly about adolescent or adult culpability without a gen-
eral and robust theory of responsibility to identify and to analyze 
the normative and factual issues. Then , the Comment addresses 
Ferd inand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and Pro fe~so r of Psychology :lllcl Law 
in Psych iatry, Univer~ity of Pennsylvania. Th is Comment was wTitten while the auth or 
was Will iam !Vl inor Li le Vi siting Professor of Law at the University o f Virginia School 
or Law. John Monahan. Elizabeth Scott, and Amy \Va.x deserve my ~nateful thanks for 
providing very helpful commenLs. I would al so like to than k my personal attorney. Jean 
Av net Morse, for her input. 
1 Franklin E. Zimring. The Hardest of the Hard Cases: Adolescent Homicide in Ju ve-
nil e and Criminal Courts, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 437 , 469 (1999). 
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whether Professor Zimring's motivating case studies do lhe wo rk 
thllt he intends. I·-.Jex t, the Comment turns to an anal is of Pro lces-
sor Zirnr in z's arguments concernin g diminished responsibilitv 
·~ ......... c._. ~ _,. 0 
i\1y theses ~\ re first, th :Jt with a theory of responsibility in pbce, 
I . . - ' • ' ·1· f' d 1 1 . 'I · u:tern1mau.m oi tnc cul pa m 1ty o a o1escent Kli!erc; 1s compli-
···:• t ·"ri h tl' 'i<')t .. , , . 1~ ,,, ., ,; .. ,111:-11']\' i'Qp•;olic" ltPd '!'' Pn)f~· ··:;Y' 7 in·-·.· i·· r 
..... . . l ... \,_,..__, \..' ... ~- ~ ~ .;,. ~ ,] c'·- ll \,\_ .... J ..... l. _, ..... .... .1""- _ ...... (. __,. (-- ~ · .l. , ,_ ,_. .'J ._ ,, __ , ~ .:.... ...... .. ~ !It~ ~ ~ 
L;clic\'CS, and ~' econd _ that ITlOSt of the V/ise rc.co .n1n1{>~1 d ~ ~ti r)n:' he 
. - (' ~ , 1 1 l . 1 urges 1m pl y re:mi·ms tl1at extena to ac 01escents \vno <>:·;n ;-;~ll t Gtncr 
crimes and to adul t offenders. In a few words, I do :1 Ut think th at 
'lrl ,-, ·IP"C'ent l. O'll: C I. C]u l. S ·he "h·lrO'e -t of' tl1e har·rl C"SC· , . . . t\ r1;'lCI:~ .lt t_d.JU l . ... ~- _ !l jl . l \ . ..- . l l i1L~ S - l! ". \...t u .. ~. !'::..·-<-jt.- . . i\...c. ~-
ing the cuipability of ado lescents vvho ki ll is just one of many harcl 
cases that can be resolved by the same general princi ples, properly 
understood, that sho uld gu ide all cu lpability and dispos ition analy-
sis, fo r adults and adolescents alike . The Commen t concludes with 
my ovvn recommendations for adolescent offenders \-\ho commit 
senous cnme~;. 
I. RESPONSIB ILITY AND EXCUSE 
Adolescents as a class are surely different from adults-they 
are less mature, for example--but do the undoubted differences 
n1akc a moral difference? Are adolescents less respon sible and 
why? Ans·vVering this question depends on whether a moral theory 
vve accept dictates differential treatment. Although we tend to be 
sympathetic to "chi ldren ,'' difference does not necessarily entail 
diminished responsibility. Assuming otherwise begs the question. 
Thus, any sensible analysis of adolescent moral responsibi lity 
must begin wi th a theory of moral responsibili ty generally . There 
is no reason to be lieve that di fferent theories of responsibility gov-
ern different age groups. Rather, a unified theory of responsibility 
might very \Nell req uire different outcomes for different types of 
offenders, such as for people vvith and withou t severe mental dis-
order or for adolescents and adults. A potentially cornpelling case 
for dim ini shed responsibility arises on ly if the distin guishing char-
acteri stics of adolescents raise mitigating or excusing cond itions. 
Let us ~ he refore turn briefly to the theory of responsib ility and ex-
cuse that infonns criminal law . 
Analysis of responsibility and excuse usuall y proceed:-; in two 
''tP[J ' F;,-, j· v:e nck 'W l1 o' l1e'· a- ll a creJ1l has dOJ' e r\'i'l \! L'-~-1i •'~' ''•V'i'O l'U ..) . v u. _ _.._.~...__~, lV ct...J • V L .l C (. ..._ L (.. t.l .) .!~.~ !C V t~ ' 
whether the person has violated a moral or legal ru le . Second, we 
J 999] Co Ill ill en ro rr ill ~· -r! _ J 
mqmre whether the offender should be excused from the usually 
deserved response to the violation . In criminal justice terms, the 
steps correspond to th e sequential consideration of prima fac ie 
criminal iiability and then of exc using or mi tigating affirmMive 
C!p t'1'PS\' S T h r-' o!'fe·lcler ''" S't h]'CI'tivit\1 is cn;y ; r 1 "' J' ~'rl ~l t bn 1 h Si 'l(rp c· \....- \,...' •• <../ , . !{\.... 1 ....- I ! ,) 'I_ L _l_ -"""' <. _, .._ \ _ _11 ~"') j _ .._l\_, \...-~ ...._ '-· .__, \,_11 --.-~!. ,:::'-· ,) . 
I' ri I''l''' ! ~ , . _., in l''lJ'' ci ,,. r; ·1l e·cl h v t 11'" i ,. Pl •~ 1-, r.-,1 ·-·.:" r- ." •1 · (~ :1 Il l. n -'"' '' P ;· ·.: ,.1 ,, . h ....._.. ~, !1 ...-. 1 ,_, 1 \_.. t •> ;(. 1.. . Ll . • ·'} \...1 \...,,. -•- "-' l .U . c..~ L (t\. -_.. _, _ 1 ._~ ~ .._, 1, 1 .....- .'.~ "' · '·- •'-!.-_ 
as intent or rc: ... ~ J .. Jessn ::-=: :-\ :-;. l\Jlon.;()Ver) the seric;u~:ne s s C)f ;_·u: r;ffei-_{sc 
'll1d 1]•·• (' ') '1 ' :<-'nUC 'l' lJ"ni c·h nl''l1t iP l·> r ae I' ' ''C n (' '~'": rl (' [' t h<-' P' <'' ;· ;';ll (... , ..._ 1 \... ~ \_ l • . . . -....... ~i l L l L! .<- J. , I • ._ ~ V . I 1 .l Lt.l c t .l Ll l .,_i _.. i , •-" 1 • <._ J 1 I • · •. ~ -. 1 • - • ll ..._ j,_ 
state \\,.·ith \vhic h it is cor11111itted because the offender' s rGcnta1 
state indicat.:s hi s or her attitude towards the rights and interest:; of 
others. Ki lling purposely, for exarnple, in general demonstrates 
less concern for life than killing recklessly. Mental states such as 
purpose, knm.vlec!ge, and awareness of risk have ord inary lan-
£Lta£e, common sense meaninQ:s and do not require tbe ccmacitv 
~ '---' .._. 1 "" 
for moral refl ec tion or the like. There is thus limited scope for in -
eli vidualizati on of culpability based on the mental state with which 
a crime is cornmit ted. 
Even if an offender's conduct meets the definition of the of-
fense, including its subj ective mental state elements, the offender 
might nonetheless deserve mitigation or full excuse if a partial or 
complete excusing condition, such as infancv or leQ:al insanitv. 
....... .I ....... .; ' 
obtains. Vi rtually all moral and legal excusing conditions depend 
on some defect in the offender's general capacity to grasp and be 
guided by good reason, in the offender ' s "normati ve compe-
tence. "=' The law typically adopts bright line rules for the excuses, 
but in principle, nonnative capacity is distributed along a contin -
uum, and consequently, responding to this capacity \voul cl permit 
substantial individualization of culpability attributions and pun-
ishment. Indeed, such individualization occurs largely at sentenc-
ing and in particular at capital sentencing proceedings. 
Virtually all adolescent killers clearly have the capacity to 
form and do form the n1ental states requ ired by the definitions of 
homicide and Gther offenses. They kill m1 pu rpose. or they ~t n: 
aware thut they are creating a great and unjust ifiable risk of death 
2 [borrow thi·. kl ic itous phra~e from Jay Wall~lce . R. Jay w~\ llace. Respun,;ibiiit y Ui>d 
the Moral Scnti mcnb 16. 86-87 ( i 9':J4) . Duress is the clearest countere x~nnp!c , but no 
one wo ul d claim t h~ll adnk-:;cents or ai:y olhc r i ck n ti!i ~1b ic class of peop!c , such a:; l.h ~.• :;e 
with menl~il disonkr. have diminished responsibili ty generally because they act und-:r 
duress. 
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or serious bodily injury. or they kill inadvertently in circumstances 
in which they should know and are capable of knowing that they 
are creat ing a great and unju st i fiabie risk of death. In an individual 
case there may be a factua l dispute about which of these mental 
states was formed. hut such questi ons ari se with eq ual frequency 
both in c a ~.;cs of non hnmiciclc cri mes adolesce nts co mmi t and in 
cases of homicide by adults. All u llcndcrs who kill on purpose. 
vv hethcr they are young or o ld , arc committing the same o ffen se. 
An excusing or mitigating condition must be present if the of-
fender wishes to avoid full responsibility for the offense. 
I suggested above that lack of the general capacity to grasp and 
be guided by reason is the most general excusing condition. It ex-
plains , for example , why very young children and some people 
with severe mental disorder are excused if they do wrong. Age and 
mental disorder alone are not excusing conditions, but they can 
interfere with general nonnative competence. Normative incapac-
ity as the most general excusing condition also explains a standard 
mitigating circumstance such as the common law's provoca-
tion/passion doctrine that reduces an intentional homicide from 
murder to voluntarv manslau2:hter or the Model Penal Code's ex -
J ~ 
paneled formulation , ' 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is reaso nable explanation or excuse."3 Intentional kill-
ers whose rationality is diminished in part for non-culpable rca-
sons deserve a lesser degree of blame and puni shment than equally 
intentional killers whose normative competence is intact. 
The ques tion is whether adolescent homicide offenders, and 
adolescent offenders in general, are sufficiently less normatively 
competent to warrant mitigation or excuse when they kill inten-
tionally, recklessly, or negligently. Professor Zimring concludes 
that they are and that they must be treated differently from adults . 
Let us now turn to Professor Z imring 's reasons. 
IT . THE CASE STUDIES 
Professor Zimring uses a series of case studies to motivate the 
widely-shared intuition that adolescents are clifferent, 4 tha t there is 
~ Moclel Pen ztl Code. ~ 2 1 0.:1 ( ! )(b) (O ffici~! Draft 1980) . 
-1 See Paul H. Robinson & Joh n M. D~rlev. Justi ce. LiabilitY & Bl::tme: Co mmunitv 
.I ' ~ ~ 
Views ~nd the Criminal La w I :19- 1-1 7 ( 19'J5) (reponing that lay re sponden ts believe th at 
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no typ ical adolescent homi cide case, and that adolescent homicide 
thus requires unusually diffi cu lt assessment. My conclus ion fro m 
th e cases , however, is that they do not support the claim that ado-
lescent homicide is somehow spec ia l or that it requi res particularl y 
complicated legal ana lysis tu determine the ki ller' s culpability. 
Pv1\JS t of th e cases arc either atypica1 ad\ ) l ~ ~~~.~· e nt ki ll ers or are not 
( i!. ' !i;Hrl! ;S11· JhJ le "t-1 ' ')'11 '\dll lt k ill er· · .• ·' • ·' · ·~ 1, l<L~ ~- ._.- \.. l 1 (_ - \. , l 1 ~), 
Professor Z imrin g's icon ic ca:-;e is the traged y of M alcolm 
Shabazz, the twelve-year-old grandson of l\ila lcolm X, who used 
ga:)oline to set fire to his grandmother ' s apartment knowing tha t 
she was home, and as a result , his grandmother burned to death. 
M alcolm is described as "extremely troubl ed." a chronic firesetter, 
and w ith clinical manifestatio ns of sch izophrenia, including the 
possib ility that hi s deeds were moti vated by the fantasy that there 
was an " imaginary companion called S ini ster Torch ."5 A clinical 
psychologist who examined Malcolm concluded that he did not 
consciously intend to harm his grandmother; instead his deed was 
an " unconscious act to scare her, make her change, get her to do 
what he wanted."6 
Professor Zimring recognizes that Malcolm is not a typical 
ado lescent killer- he was younger than most, ac ted alone, and 
there was evidence of substanti al mental disorder. Professor Zi m-
ring concludes that in this case youth and maturity are not just 
factors to be added on to modify an otherwise deserved penali ty . 
Rather, immaturity allegedly "has a pervasive influence on a large 
number of subjective elements of the offense, including cognition, 
volition, and appreciation that behavior such as setting a fire can 
produce results like the death of a person. " 7 Immaturity is never 
spec ifically defined. And, I do not precisely understand either the 
d iffe rence between cognition and the appreciation of the conse-
quences of action- the latter is seemingl y an instance of the for .. 
mer- or how voli tion bears on the mental state elements of an of-
fense, although it may bear on affirmative defenses. Let us 
rclli onal capacities increase from age s ten through ei ghtL:en and that in general younger 
offend ers should not be processed in the adult criminal justice system) . 
:i Zimring. supra note I, at 441. 
6 lei. (quot ing Jane Gross, Expens Tes tify Shabazz Boy is Psychot ic, N.Y. Times, Jul y 
30 . 19':!7 . a t 81). 
7 lei . 
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examine in dera il , however, whether Malcolm 's case demonstrates 
a generalizab1e. pervasive influ ence of imrnaturitv on cu lpability 
for homicide by adolescents. 
The case c ie~,lrly ca lls for vast rnitigation C!r '~x c u~;e, btJt not 
pri n:Jri 1y L;ccause of the pervaE~ivc int-1U(;l1CL" uf r~.t1 :_llc c) hT1-S in1n1a-
t uri t~/ in P rof(;~~s o r Z in1ri n g ~ s sense . Cc)n :~idcr fir:-~t the ~lnaly~;i~~ of 
rncns rea . '"fhei ·e is no que:; ti on that l\/Ia1co lrn lntenti c; nally set the 
f;r" -~ '' Pn i~· ··r: t•i·1 .o- the f:r·e w~s ., " cc) ·tn'.' ''.l"l·,.e ·· ·:···r "' "C t1 1. F t.t ·va" J. I ~ C...- , ..__ • _, 1, , 1 ,) ._. .._ L. 11 ::: ~ 11 .....- t c l, Ll .\ !_; .._, .-, \- ~...- { ...... ...- •.- ,,... -.. ..1.. \ L ,_., 
directed by an im ag in ary compani on, and even if \V C fully accept 
the ev2luation of the clinical psycholo~ist ouut< . .xl above. s T hen. in 
~ 1 • 
princi ple, determining whether M alcolm killed his grandmother 
purposely. knowingly, reckl essly , or negl igentl y is no different 
from making the sarne determination in the case of an adult of-
fender. Assuming that M alcolm killed ne ither purposely nor 
knowingly, his inexperi ence , unconsciou s psychodynamics, and 
rnental abnormalities might indeed cast light on whether he was 
conscious ly aware of the risk of death. For example, if we credit 
the clincial psychologist's evaluation, Malcolm might not have 
been aware of the risk of death, but he would be guilty of negli-
gent homicide. Malcolm's case lends itself to precisely the same 
type of men s rea analysis applicable to an adult killer, for whom 
rnental abnormalities, unconscious dynamics and life experience 
might also be relevant to a proper mens rea determination. In any 
case, vie\ving the evidence most favorably to Malcolm, even stan-
dard mens rea analysis would hold him guilty of only the lowest 
degree of culpable homicide. 
Professor Zimring writes that immaturity has a pervasive in-
fluence on the "subjective elements" of the offense , but even 
twe lve-year-olds can kill purposely, knowingly and recklessly. 
Moreover. vol iti on has little to do with mens rea. Volition is a 
poorly understood concept,9 but e ither it bears on whether the 
t; The evaluati on is largely incoherent bcctusc: it den ies that he> cotJsciously me;mt to 
harm hi \ gran cl tnothcr. but ne ve r di sc loses what hi .s conscious imenti on was. vVe are to ld 
that he 1\·as unulnsc iou sly moti vated to scare ~end manipulate her. but such unconscious 
dc~:i re;; do Illlt nccc>:;saril y negate men s rea, am! again. we cln nut J..:nuw what he did in-
tcttd w do. [ suggest in the tex t, infra. that if w,; credit the ev;tl u~ttion. it sugges ts that 
i\'LllcDim wanted his grandmother to live and thu <: was tlO l C<msc iPusl y aware that the t'it·e 
;;, ic.ht kill he r. Thu:.;_ he would be guilty of negli~:e nr humic ide. 
9 ~Fo r the most thorough. 1·ece11t :malys is in thc~ l ega l lit c :·aturc. sc:t: gt:nerall y Michat:l S. 
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agcnt acted at all , which is not an issue in l\!Ialcolm · s case because 
1• f' r·it'orh, ~wted or on CX"USe AG~t;n 1Llck of exr>er;pn'''" q•iahr !_(,_, · · ...- .:. ~--- ---'-,) '- .....- ' ....., '- • ·-=-- 1.-t~ .. ...._ "-!_--'""'"' 1'..--_ ~...._ . ...__.. 1.,1 ,":':) _ -
cast doubt on whether M alcoln: subjectively appreciated the 
' ' ' ' ' 1 ' ' l 1 ' - ' ' lJut t111s IS tl: e only ll11111aturlty-re _1atect consicieratlC)n tnc c ase 
r ;_-;i ~:~\-=s ~ ;Jnd sLu-ely fv'I alcolrn's rnt~ntal Llbnorrnalities \;vcre \/a~-;t1y 
.- ) :--,- . 
\. ' ~ ... __ 
d uces . 
~ 11 ex ·pl ai 11-i_l-!g \V l1 y· h ~~ l-!-1 i gh t rlot 11 (t \/~ 
rl~;~;- tJ f (k_::ath he creatccL ~C{) :~c::~ this~ 1n1 
l":(:c C)f ITle1t t ;J.1 al;norl-t-ra.lit)' \\/as presen t. 
Professor Zimrin2: also claims that a twenty- fi ve-year-olcl ar-
~ . . 
sonist with no developmental difficulties is cornmining a d iffe rent 
crime from I\1alcolm's because the two have differe nt charactcri~;­
tics and perceptions. Vv'ith respect, however, this hypothetical 
loads the deck. Different characteristics and perceptions produce 
di fferent crimes only if they produce different mens rea. Conse-
quently, we must ask what, precisely, did the arsonist do? If he is a 
professional and was extremely cautious about human life but 
killed nonetheless, he is a negligent killer. 10 As such, he has com-
mitted precisely the same crime as M alcolm , assuming that 
Malcolm ki lled negligently. The arsonist should be treated differ-
ently, of course, but not because he committed a d ifferent crin1e. 
He should be treated more harshly because, unlike M alcolm, the 
hvoothetical arsonist has no plausible claim for excuse or !Tliti!Ia-
" I ~ 
tion. 
Even if Malcolm intended to kill his grandmother, excuse or 
miti£ation is warranted first because he was too young. to have 
~ • L 
achieved full moral rationality. I agree with Professor Zimring that 
twel ve-year-olds should not be treated like older adolescents or 
;:'du1ts because thev do not have the fo rmal rnoral reasonimr oo\v--- - ' ~ c 1 -
I 11 b , l h • • ' • y-, C l :~rs rnat are usua 1y o tmnec ~'Y rmc1-actolescence. but, tew twe ve-
yeclr-olcls ki ll in any case, so Malcolm is an atypicaily young kil-
fvloorc, Act ~1nd Crime: The Philosophy of Action and lts Implicati ons for Criminal Lnv 
11_1- i 65 ( 1 993) 
!U 'Vbiculrn might of course be guilty fur felony murder, based un the prediGltc: felony 
of arson, unless he is also not re~;pon s ible for the arson. The adult arsonist is :;imilariy 
situated. But let us bracket the fclotiy murder isscte. I di scuss iciony murder in Part IILE. 
i nfr;t. 
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le r. and he is no t a typ ical twelve-year-old because he suffe rs from 
sw:h ~:;criou s me ntal abnormaliti es. Thus. we cannot ge nera lize 
from his case about the effects of immaturi ty on nws t adolescent 
kill ers. A. s Professor Z imring notes, the vast maj orit y of ado lescent 
killer'; :.lrc :r: id to la te ado lescents an d have reached the age ol" 
•. ,. ,.,[ .:·• .1, r: i ; <\"I':' J i ! \' ~r - 1T ~1 1 ''l~J] "r1 ' ' <: .1 1yll11 '.ll' ! ,. ; t" ( j,·Jc'S 1"•' ( 1"ll·l, .l' . ' '1 :' · .. · 0 1 !""" .! II \. • _.._ •• l . • • t ... l .. , . ... ~·, ~ .... . 1.._ 1 -. J . ! ( ·- 1 1-J ._ . \ -.....-. ..._ . _1 .t - · (~ J . ..... . - \.!._ - ' - ' " ~ 
'l_-_ ,~·(·.·.•,·.·- ·'·'""· '···' :, :q r :: ~ - :11 -~<: 1-1 ,.~ '!·"··l·'" ·1•1oP l ~- ~lli. I)l' "t li t " ! ~ ·ll ir !·• :• c1•· '<· ..,,.) ~ -- , .._ : t . ..._ ! . -~., ... \~-- · _ ·~- ( l'.,...J>... 1 I -' - (l . .. . . I<. . ... __ • ~ . It_ , • • \ .\..- .. ~.Ll l ) ,_; , _ 
O•' ji>'i '!l ; t '"""' l' !"> :· ··!c 'LO •tcl o ' f-'('C~ C '1t 1t' il!P··s ;"()S l C)f '"l' ~"'11! : l["i' r'[;c:· t in -.::::'- .>.,..... . (~ ·· - t_) l:-' - ---' - l ~ .... . ! c -- 1'-' d . • ~ '- \,.l. ~ . 1 1 .. \-'. j .._; _ -· -- ,__, '~ ld ... .. _ 
• , 1 
gui ::;na o :~~ -
Ev•::n il. Malco lm had reached mid-adolescence, he \V Oulcl st ill 
warrant an exc use or miti gation because he suffered from substan-
tial n1 en tal abnormalities, We do not have sufficient fact s to per-
form a compiete anal ysis, but it is clear that Malcolm 's capac ity to 
grasp an d be guided by reason was seriously deficient and not 
primaril y becau se of immaturity . Even the intentional firese tting 
per se should be excused if Malcolm was genuinely compell ed to 
set it. Again , in principle the analysis is the same as wo uld be per-
formed for an adult Imagine a jilted twenty-five- year-old with 
firesetting problems- adults , too, suffer from "pyromania" 11 - and 
ev idence of de lusions and hallucinations who se ts fire to the 
apartment of th e woman who jilted him , causing her death, I con-
tend that this case call s for the same considerations based on 
mental abnormality as Malcolm' s, even thou gh Malcolm is an 
early adolescent 
The further cases Professor Zimring adduces, none of which 
includes sufficient factu al detail to enable a textured an alys is, do 
not suggest that homicide by adolescents is morall y and subjec-
tively distinctive . The second case concerns a seventeen-year-old 
"hit man" who dropped a crime boss. The third involves a " sense-
less" ki llin g by a thirteen-year-old who got into a shov ing match 
11 American Psyc hi atri c A~s ·n . Diagnosti c and Stat ist ica l Manual o f Menw l Di so rders 
6 1-'1-15 (-'lt h eel . 1994) [herein after DSM-lV]; Ve rnon L. Qui nsey et al. , Vioknt Offend-
ers: i'l.ppr~Ji s in g and tvlanaging Risk 103 - 11 7 ( 199S) (desc ribing and :tnalyzing the em-
pi t·ical literature). Indeed, in DSM- lV "compu lsive· · ti reserring is primaril y a icatu rc of 
adu lt psvc!wpathology, whereas repetitive, persistent firesetting, with out any necessary 
ind icat ion of compulsion, is onl y one cri te ri on for the more genera l chi ldhood d iag nosi s 
of Conduct Di so rder . Other c rit e ri ~t mu st also be present to make the: chilclhoocl cktgno-
,; is. and the riresetting criteri on requires th at the child set fire s delibera tely with the in-
tent ion of L· ausing damage. DSM -fV at 90-91 . 
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and argument \vith a girl and then shot her when she dared him to 
use the gun he carried. The fourth is a fourteen-year-old who with 
two accomplices shot a Briti sh tourist in Florida. The final case is 
a fou rteen-year-old 1.vho broke up a school prayer meeting by 
shooting at attendin g stu de nts. killing two and injuring six. i am 
not sure what these c: t s(.'~; arc supposed to suggest about aclt)i,~·::ccnt 
homic ide ~enc rail v . l\.\O involve unusuall v voun 2: kill ers. and !111.:: • . . ...___ .. ' .I .. '-' • - · 
r~1ngc of c ircumstanct~s d cH~s nul seem distingui shable from th c:;c 
in adu lt cases . None would be surprising if the killer's agt: were 
eighteen or older. 
Afte r presenting these cases, Professor Zimring argues that the 
atypicality of adol escent killings is a "jurisprudential argument 
rather than a criminological assertion." 12 He recognizes that there 
are typical patterns to adolescent homicides, but suggests that 
blameworthiness for adolescent killers comes in "many different 
sizes" and that "the number of significant variables and the di stri-
bution of factors influencing culpability is great. "13 Surely this as-
sertion is equally true for adult killers. Consider the factors cited to 
support the assertion: age-related judgment and experience; the 
prec ipitating circumstances and whether they were the fault of the 
acc used; and the offender's degree of involvement if the killing 
was committed by a group. Although one might argue that the 
judgment skills of adole scents are substantially weaker than those 
of adults, judgment skills and the gains from experience do not 
stop developing at age eighteen, and the distributi on of such skills 
among adults is broad. Precipitating circumstances are already a 
crucial factor for adults, both in terms of prima facie liability and 
at sentencing. The degree of involvement in group criminality is 
less important for liability than it should be for adults, but it is 
considered by some states, it is considered at sentencing, and there 
is little reason to believe that "involvement" is more important to 
adolescent than to adult culpability.14 
In sum, the cases do not demonstrate that adolescent homicide 
is atypical or that adol escent killers raise particularly difficult or 
12 Zirnring , supra note I, at -1-1 3. 
13 IJ. at 4-13--1-1. 
14 Suscept ibility to peer press ure, another factor that conce rns Professor Zimring. is 
indepenJen t of invoh·ement and will be considered in the nex t section. 
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di st inguishable issues concerning the ir culpabili ty for homic ide. 
L ike adul t cases, some adolescent cases are easy and some are 
ha rcl. 
i l l. D!M li\'lSHED RESPOI\!S !BlLTY A ND L A \V REFORM 
;--... • • l l 'l . 1 . . , , . ~ ,---, . • ' 1 
, ,,,.1 ,p• ··~' '"( r·f"'"P· 0'''' ! J'l ' 'V 1,- :j n '!!-, • ... :-;-·o~ · / 'll"' ' llo s " l'C> cT>'-;t"'·': J_ _./ .:1• l~l•....,ol\_, , 1 ~:'l• ll.J ~ 1 • l,.,' ."'> •. , ~ .__., ,,1\_ f ~ -.. 1 ~J! i ;::::- •- .) . \ .::._--..,:::-• _,, .,y \ _~ 
r[i)r· t:·i n ·.i ~ · t!J' to iu c-tiC( r'o r '" i'J ]·" ( '<·' ! ' \. l · jjl ,-,·,; 'lil i)C'l1 0' j' iv· ic· \....- , .__ - ~~ .! l.li ! . /<;_-~ I L . j • ' , l ( l '-. \ 1._.'1_.....,, 1 l \.. \.....l, _, . ( !.! J "::_-. 1 ll...._. t , ) 
' 1 I l ' ' ' ' 1 • I somet1mcs unc ear w 1ct lt:r tne concept ';no u!Ci oe mcorpoi·at::u 
into the elements of the prima facie case , \Vhether it should be 
treated as a mitiga ting affirm.a ti vc clefen:-;e , or whether it should be 
a vari ab le considered at sentencing . ln either case, however, a 
concept that mu st do as much work as Professor Zimring asks of 
diminished responsibility should be defined suffic ientl y p rec iseiy 
to permit the work to go on, but no such definition is forthcoming. 
I do no t think that this is a quibble or that this concern derives 
from an unrealisti c desire for unnecessaril y precise or operation-
alized definiti ons. Real criteria arc necessary to permit sensible 
analysis. Nevertheless, the only crite ri a provided are that adoles-
cents in general are less mature, more susceptible to peer pressure , 
and less skilled at dealing with provocation than adults . Maturity 
and immaturity are too vague to be useful , but their moraliy rele-
vant components are never specifi ed. No argument is provided for 
why susceptibility to peer pressure is a responsibility dimini shing 
variable. Finally, no evidence that I k now of suggests that ado les-
cents in fact are less skilled than adults in dealing with provoca-
tion, although there is evidence that adolesce nts in general mav be 
~ ..... .I 
more impulsive than adults.15 In a word, I fear that Professor Z im-
ring has begged the question of dimini shed respons ib ili ty, assum-
ing w ithout demonst rating that it applies to adolescents generally. 
Having said thi s, I mu st confess that I share his conclusion . After 
considering Professo r Z imr in g' s arguments fo r diminished respon-
!5 Jorge H. Darun a & Pat ri cia!\. Barnes.;\ Ne uruclcvelop nJ elllal V iew of Impuls ivity , 
in The Impul sive Client : Theory. Research, and Trea tmen t 23 (W illi am G. !vlcCown et 
al. eels., 1993) : see also Judy Zaparniuk & Steven Taylor. Im pul sivity in Children and 
Adolescent s. in Impu lsivity: Theory. Assess ment. and Treat ment i 58 - I 79 (Christopher 
D. Webster & Margaret A. Jackso n eels. , 1997) (reviewing th e conceptua l and rese11d1 
li krature, but also noting tin t impu lsivity is nut~~ unitary or well -conceptuali zed var iabk 
and tha t it is a featu re of adult behavior as well ). Mureove r, we do not know the com-
parat ive d i.>:t ribu tion of adolescen t and adult provoked killings . so it is not clear that th is 
variab le wou ld have much prac ti L·al bite. [ suspect th at it does . howeve r. 
---------------------------=~ 
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sibility. I shall offer my own . 
/\. Fou r ObsermTions Abour D iminished Re:.J.JOIIsi!Ji!itY und DeserT 
1 -
f)J·o -f'(::.cc ()l' ~/ ;nl'- ; fiCT~ C 'Ji-(r jl!'•leJ"t i,e- 'T :"f' ~· l"""\• l C.:..Jl f"T\.'r - -,!....~ J· - ! 0 t- !- .}< c-' 'j 
, t~ .o-' ~•ILl, '.::; ·' '-'~-'-' l L; 2:,1 '··' -'} --- ·.:::~.::-L . .; (,c Ulcl ! -
n;i nishecl re spof!~~i biL l.y >;hc~uid be part l'f th•.: ~\: ! erne !it ~~ c)f the of-
ft..:.nse"l (l tha"L d r-2fin ~:: th~; :_tpp ru r;r i at!~ r:_t ng:e of dcs{.:rv';:d r~u nishnlt~nt. 
I do not understan\..L hr)\\\~· \,·~ :r· _ hc; \.v cti111Jnishcd r~.::~;p ( .J!1:~ i -bi 1-it )'---a 
doctrine tvoica11v of :Jffi. rn~ ~H. 1 ve c~.efe n se--c~tn L;c r;~;.rt c}f the elc--
.,1 A .., 1 
ll 'Pnts o·t' t1ne ot'fe 'l "P Th·· r·•ctc·rv Pru"t··,('CJ'lj' Zt.""I1J';l~O" ~'c1 Cl1 L'Ce s-l._.. 1 .. . . • -...... . "'~ t ._, !LL ·- Jt,_) ~ .... C._J.,v J ~ l L!,::- u. J t , 
immaturity. psycbolog ic ~d handicaps. and inabili ty to appreciate 
ri sked consequences--might all bear on the offender" s mens rea, 
but this raises a separate quest ion, a standard mens rea analysis. I 
fail to see, however, how lhese undeniably relevant factors could 
be incorporated into the doc trinal mens rea elements of homicide. 
After al1 , for example, i mm~lture and handicapped people can kill 
in tentionally. 
Diminished responsibili ty suggests, in contrast, that an agent 
who killed with a particular mens rea is not as fully culpable as 
other agents who killed with the same mens rea. The primary rea-
son, I have suggested, is that the agent acted with non-culpably 
diminished capacity to grasp and be guided by reason. It is easy to 
comprehend how Professor Zimring's factors could be incorpo-
rated into a rich theory of mitigation and exc use that might play a 
role at sentencing in sett ing the appropriate penalty within a de-
served range. Mens rea and the other elements defining crimes 
would set the range; considerations of diminished responsibility 
would inform the condign sentence within the range. Finally, once 
again, I see no reason why suc h factors should not be considered 
in adult cases as well, and Professor Zimring orovides no reason to 
~ 1 
insist on the distinction between adolescen ts and adults. 
Next, Professor Zimring makes four general observations con-
cerning diminished capacity on account of you th and just punish-
n1ent fo r youths. I agree 1.vith most of what he says , but the obser-
vations apply with equai force to ::tdo lescents who commit crimes 
other than homicide and to nclult offenders as welL The first ob-
servation is that doctrines of diminished responsibility should be 
16 Z imring. supra note L ~1t -1-4 7. 
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applicable throughout the full spectrum of offense severity and 
that the moral consistency of the criminal law requires that suc h 
doctrines should stand or fall as issues of general applicability. To 
begin. I do not understand what is meant by th e pluraL "doctrines'· 
o f diminished responsibility. 17 Is Proressor Zimring referring to a 
c, ; : ·;~ ~ : i c·~. of distinct , potentiall y mi t igating factors like th ose 
CJ IIi ctbovc, or is diminished respo nsib ility <t unitary mitigating 
cnwi! ti!.W \l wt can be supported by e vilknu; of an y number of 
rek\·:.mt v:lriables? It would be helpful to know the content of the 
doc trine or doctrines we are consicle1ing. !n e ither case, if an o f-
fe nder might be nonculpably less responsible for various reasons , 
why shouldn't the doctrine that instantiates such claims apply to 
a ll crimes and to a ll offenders? An angry adolescent or an angry 
adult might kill, burn, or assault in response to anger. Adolescents 
and adults alike, although perhaps for different reason s, might suf-
fer diminished rationality. Why not apply diminished responsibil-
ity across the board? 
The second observation is that the impact of diminished re-
sponsibility produced by immaturity or personal handicaps (never 
defined) will be greater when subjective elements are more im-
portant in setting the range of appropriate punishment. Once again , 
it is unclear whether the observation extends to th e definitional 
e lements of the crime or to a mitigating condition or affirmative 
defense. Professor Zimring's discussion sugges ts the former , but 
immaturity and other personal handicaps are unlikely to negate 
mens rea, especially among the substantial majority of adolescent 
k illers, who are fifteen or older. Professor Zimring also notes the 
role of motivation , but motivation rarely plays a role in mens rea; 
motivation issues are raised largely by affirmative defenses and at 
sentencing. In any case, the same arguments apply with equal 
fo rce to adult crimes that require greater subjecti vity . 
T he third observation is that some forms of liability, such as 
accomplice liability and conspiracy, depend almost entirely on 
menta l state and not on objective conduct elements. In such cases , 
Professor Zimring argues, diminished responsibility caused by 
immaturity has greater potential fo r mitigation than in crimes for 
17 lei . 
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whi ch co nduct is a more cruc ial e lement. Once aga in , howe ver, 
the discussion suffers fro m a hazy di stincti on bet ween rnens rea 
analvs is and affirm at ive defense. Adolesce nts mav be more sub-
- J 
j eer to peer in fl uence and more likel y to com mi t cr imes in groups 
than adult::. . / \ s a result. one mi ght w ish to claim th <tt lh .::y are les ~; 
rcsponsib k when th '--~Y act un der peer in fluenc\~ et nd in ::::ro u p~;-- -· 
althuugh th is rcLJ ui res a n argument. BuL the re is nn : ·c~:. :-; cm to 
be lieve that an adolescent accomp lice o r conspirator docs not have 
the purpose to promo te or facilitate the object crime. Moreover. 
even on th e ::tffirmative defense inte rpre tati on of Pro fessor 
Z imrin g·s observation, no evidence is offered to suggest that peer 
inlluence plays more of a role in homi cide than in other adolescent 
crimes, and no argument is provided to support the impli cation 
th at adult accompli ces and conspirators should be denied the 
benefit o f diminished responsibility in appropriate cases . 
Professor Zimring' s final observation concerns standard pre-
su mpti ons, such as that people intend the natural and probable 
consequences of the ir acts . Professor Zimring wonders whether 
such presumpti ons apply to twelve- , fourteen-, and six teen-year-
olds. In the first place, of course, these presumpt ions are not man-
datory , and if they shift the burden of persuasion , they are uncon-
s titutiona l. They are simply commonsense "rules of thumb" to 
help the factfinder decide whether a requis ite mens rea was pres-
e nt. Professor Zimring is right that such a presumption may be 
prejudicial when used in the case of a twelve-year-old , bu t it may 
be equall y prejudici al, for example , if used in the prosecu tion of a 
normal but ex treme ly mentally slow adult. Furthermore, most 
adolescent killers are fifteen or older, and the standard presump-
tions most ass uredly apply to them as well as they do to most 
adults. 
Profess or Zimrin g concludes this section by suggesti ng that 
case by case dete rminati ons of culpability are as important in j u-
venile homici de cases as in any other type of case. I agree , but not 
because the offender is a juvenile. Homicide is in general the most 
serious cri me and carri es significant puni shment, even for its low-
est deg rees . Case by case culpability determinatio ns should always 
be req uired before our soc iety imposes blame, punishrnent, and 
stigma on any cri minal , and especially so in homicide cases, 
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whether involving adolescents or adults, in which these pote nt ial 
in1posi tions are heaviest. Of course , when immaturity . like maiiY 
other poten tia ll y respons ibi lity diminishing variables, is in Issue. 
the law shou ld cons ider it fo r the gene ral reaso n just given . 
P rrlfe ~· ' ' ('!. 7 i 1111·i '1 n • "' :····-'('; 1 v ·t:· o · • ~"· •·i" l t t \1•" j.LJ.<:. l' 1. ('C ( ·, \,' .·< 'L:··r·','J l ~ '\._ , l .....-...._"') .! j L..-. 1 l I :::: '- u .\. 1 ""-' ~\, I ~· {. L:::: lt ;._..- .:) l~ 1<- _ l. V ._. _ "' > '-
should adj ud icate yo un g offenders wi thout comprom ising yuuth 
poli cies generall y, anc\ vv hcre possible . should provide young pt.:o-
ple with "room to reform, " that is. it should avoid damag ing a 
young person's potenti al fo r mature, responsible citizen ship. He 
admits , however, that desert and youth policy concerns can con-
flict. Indeed, room to reform considera tions are exterior to desert . 
Some offenckrs therefore may deserve and should rece ive pu n-
ishment that will damage their developmental potenti al. ·w hen thi s 
occurs, youth policy must defer to desert , vvhich will not be unl'air 
as long as an offender 's diminished responsibility has been con-
sidered in setting the range of punishment that is appropriate to the 
offender' s culpabili ty. Then, promoting reform can help set the 
proper penalty within the deserved range, including intluencin g 
the form of criminal punishment. 
I agree entirel y with these worthy goals, but wonder again why 
they apply just to adolescent homi cide offenders and why they 
should not apply equally to other adolescent and adult offende rs. 
The justice system should full y adjudicate the culpability of any 
mid to late adolescent who commits crimes serious enough to de-
serve puni shment, and then room to reform should be a prime con-
sideration in setting the right punishment within the deserved 
range. If anythin g, ado1escent killers perhaps should receive less 
consideration of reform potenti al than adolescents who cornmit 
less serious crimes because the killers are espec ially deserving of 
punishment. ·what is more, the poten ti al fo r developmen t and re -
form does not cease at age eighteen. Many adult offe nders suffer 
from deve] oomen tal handicaps. broadly conceived . nm 2: i n s~ from 
1_ ' ' ..._, .._ 
illi teracy to dispos itional impuls ivity. A humane system of pun-
ishment woul d try to max im ize all prisoners' potential within the 
constra ints of just punishment. Adolescents as a class may be 
more developmentall y malleable or amenable to treatmen t than 
--------------------------~----====~ 
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adults, but then amenability or malleability, not age, is the opera-
tive variable. A bctler system would be to ignore malleability for 
"hardened" youths and for adults who cannot be reformed and to 
appl y the rcorn w reform concept to malleable adolescents and to 
' lurl i l ]rc '\' ' l1o (' ~' ,-. {' :-. 'Fl CT• ' H Jl t ,, uc h . ' <:; \ 1 C:. te 111 \1/() Lll c1 l'f' CJ'Lil. 't'P j'O 'l '' u'''l'!-c. ---~·L·" '\1 A ·--·-i..l ·~ _\ l ( _ , __ :::- ....... "- -l ~ , ) Ll ··..~. - 1 _\ <./ • __, VL .) 1 ( . 
t i :~_ ·; n~ t 1i /.~thlc critcri~i fur an1cnabili ~tnd rn a ll e~1bi l-
;wt now exist. 
An argurnent f>.;r ' ' !-clom to reform" that applies specially to 
adolescents. with \vhich I know Professor Zimring fully agrees, is 
not presented in thi s paper, but it strengthens his argument and de-
serves mention. We knmv that almost half of adolescents commit 
only one offense and a large majority commit no more than two. 13 
Thus, most adolescents are not at significant risk for career crimi-
nality. It appears that many adolescent single offenders commit 
their crimes in large part solely as a result of the developmental 
attributes of adolescence, which, when outgrown through normal 
maturation , will decrease markedly the risk for further offending 
for these offenders. Al though there are data that enable us to pre-
dict with some success who these adolescents are, it is not opti-
mally accurate. The alternative explanation for these data, of 
course, is that unusual and specific circumstances, rather than im-
maturity, explain the single-offending adolescent's crime. After 
all , if immaturity were really the primary explanatory variable. 
then we would expect many more adolescents to make repeated 
"mistakes.'' StilL let us make the plausible assumption that nor-
mally outgrowable immaturity plays a large role. 
The claim that maturation "cures" criminality must be distin-
guished from the amenability to treatment rationale for room to re-
form. If normal developmental immaturity is the relevant variable, 
then there is nothing "wrong" with the adolescent that requires 
"treatment.'' The justice system should simply ensure that its re-
sponse does as little as possible to inhibit normal maturation. 
Malleability or amenability to treatment, however, suggests that 
additional , undesirable variables are responsible for adolescent 
criminality and that these variables can be ameliorated by specific 
·---·------- ---
18 Marvin E. Wolfgang ct al. Delinquency in a Birth Cohort 254 (1972) (forty-six per-
cent of delinquents commit only one offense: an additional thirty-five percent commit 
only a second offense). 
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interventions, not simply throu gh maturation. Again, a ration al 
system would need the means to di stingui sh the two classes ~mel to 
respond appropriately to each. 
H it is true that many aclokscents will s impl y o utgrmv re-
offend ing. then there is speed reason to try to minim ize for them 
the inev itab ly dele teri ous effccis o f c ri minal punishm•.: nt. Here 
ag~tin , however, the confli ct with dese rt ari ses. Ma ny adolescent 
single offenders may outgrow the ncrmal. age -approp riate predi s-
position that increases the ri sk: of criminality. But, if they are nev-
ertheless responsible for their deeds, especially for serious of-
fenses such as homicide, then there is no easy resoluti on of the 
conflict between desert and facilitating growth. And , as a practical 
matter, victims , families , and perhaps a majority of society at large 
will understandably reject mild responses for respons ibl e adoles-
cents who commit serious crimes. Moreover, the compariso n to 
some adult offenders is o nce again in structi ve. Ad ult criminality, 
too, drops off with age, although not nearl y as steepl y as in late 
adolescence and early adulthood. So, many young adults will 
"mature out of ' criminality. Furthermore, many adults with un-
blemished juvenile and adult records commit single, serious of-
fenses as a result of predisposing traits that interact with particu-
larly unfortunate circumstances. but to the best of our knowledge, 
they are at little or no risk of r-e-offendin g. If they are responsible , 
however, our society rightly feels no hesi tation in imposing seri-
ous blame and punishment. 
Professor Zimring argues that needs fo r protection , education, 
mental health services, and skill development should be accom-
modated for young offenders if thi s can be achieved without com-
prom ising security. I agree entirely that these needs shou ld not be 
ignored simpl y because an adolescent deserves punishment for a 
seriou s crime or because commission of a serious crime inevitably 
betokens adult maturity. But, I also suggest that the same can be 
said for adolescent offe nders who co mmit crimes other than homi-
cide and for adults. Many adul t offenders suffer from mental dis-
orders, need educational skills, and are in great danger of p reda-
ti on in a general prison populati on. Adult offenders should not 
automaticall y lose their humanity or claims to assistance si mply 
becau se they offend. Locking people up because they deserve it, 
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whether they arc adults or adolescents , is one thing: depriving 
them unnecessarily of life chances and subjecting thern unrea-
sonably to the horrors of prison life is ~mother. 
C. The Age Spon of' Diminished f/;if it\" 
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re~.;nonsibilitv should o lav a role in dctc~rrnininc: ck::;en eel ounish-
L ..; .l .J ..___ 1 
mcnt after the age of minimum culpability i :; reached, say, be-
tween twelve and fourteen. The answer depends. he claims , on 
what "capacities" are relevant to culpability and at what age they 
are attained. At this stage, a full explanation of the theory of di-
mini shed responsibility in play is necessary. P rofessor Zimring of-
fers only that mid to late adolescents suffer from "far from trivial 
deficits" in the ability to deflect peer pressure and to respond to 
provocation. As noted above, there are good data to suggest that 
adolescents are particularly susceptible to peer pressure, although 
the data are not derived from studies of criminal conduct, 19 but 
none that I know of support the claim about provocation. Indeed, 
if adolescents are so unable to restrain themselves when provoked, 
why do so few kill? After all, provoking peers is a standard form 
of adolescent interaction. Let us assume, however, that both defi-
cits are true for adolescents generally. Still , we are not told why 
these variables diminish responsibility , why they diminish it espe-
ci a lly in cases of homicide, and why they should not also diminish 
the responsibility of adult offenders who suffer from similar defi-
cits. For the purpose of tracing the implications of the argument , 
however, let us assume further that they are relevant to responsi-
bility. 
If capacities relevant to responsibility develop with age and 
experience, as they surely do, then in general as people age and 
gain experience, they will tend, again in general, to attain increas-
ingly full responsibility. But, the curves for adolescents and adults 
overlap: There are adolescents who have attained the full capaci-
ties of adults and chronological adults who have not. Moreover, 
l'l EliLabcth 5. Scott & Thomas Grisso . The Evulutiun ur Adolescence: A Develop-
mental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform. 88 J. Crirn. L. & Criminology 137, 162 
( l 997); see genet·ally, icl. at 153-n (t-eviewing ado lc~;cent developmental psychology 
rclc\ ant to offending ). 
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grven what we know of the lives of most serious offe nders, it 
wou ld be bootless to claim that adult offender~ ·>'·i ith ckficib ace 
fully n::spunsible for their deficits. 
I ; i 'i 'ri •-' rc·r:·, 1'111 t h-=· pft'J' Cl. 0 l'C j es 0 1-l' l)ri (Th .l 1 l. 11 ' ' !' lJ ks. Th e l·f' <'' n-: , ,_._ l~tl..~ . , ) ... l .....__ .. t.\..• .._, L 1 .. .. L _...._
0
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~~~ ~--~ :~u 11plc . .,L\.ithough n1~1ny ycH.tngcr 1Jeo ple art~ rutiy c:_q; ._t hl:.; of re-
s pc~nsibl y engag ing in these acti ·v itic~ s and n·1any ~l ClL1t ~:. ~lr:.; nl) L \\'e 
arc ·.vdlil1g to ignore indi\1iduali zecl claim:;;. ev,:n tho ug h so n;e of 
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such a:s driving, involve serious risk of h<.um. But, none of these 
activities that \Ve regulate with bright line rule::; is as important to 
the total life chances of a person as criminal conviction an d pun-
ishment. When criminal culpabi lity is being adjudicated for seri-
ous crime, and punishment and stigma are at stake. justice requires 
individualization for potentially responsible agents. Evidentiary 
rul es, such as a rebuttable presumption of diminished responsibil-
ity for aclolescents,::o would promote efficiency, but they cannot 
subst itute for individualized determinations of culpability . 
Professor Zimring claims repeatedly that sentencing of homi-
cidal adolescents does not lend itself to determinate sentences that 
can be read off a grid of relevant factors. 21 He argues that there is 
no alternat ive to wide sentencing frames and individual judicial 
judgments with reasons . But, he does not give convincing reasons 
to believe that this is true only for adolescent killers and is not 
equally true for other adolescent and adult offenders . Professor 
Zimring ' s first reason for suggesting that relativel y determinate 
punishment of adolescent killers is particularly inappropriate is 
tbat punishment for homicide is already differentiated into many 
degrees based on mens rea. This is correct, but relatively determi -
nate sentencing could be imposed \Nithin each distinct degree of 
homi cide. Moreover, it is equally true of adult killers. He then 
adds that diminisb.:d responsibilitv complicates matte rs further. 
• J 
20 See Stephen J. iVl orsc:. Immaturity and lm::sronsibili ty . X3 .1. Cri;YJ. L. & Cri mino l-
ug:: \5. 63-6::! I 19971 
2! l ~:,;st!m e fnr rhc: purpose of uiscussion that we are huldi11 g r:un:-,l~:nt the ckgree of 
determinate sen tencing that might be appropriate in genera l. ;\ ~ m.: h;t\ c ~ee;L Profe:;sor 
Zirnring adopts a mixed th eory uf punishment in which desert is <1 neces:;~1ry but not suf-
fi cient justification that sets a range of deserved punishm ·~n t within which L·onsequential 
justi t'ic:~1rions dictate the proper sentence. 
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This is also true, but diminished responsibility complicates all 
sentenc ing , including other crimes by adolescents and c rin 1 -;:~; 
committed by adults. 
( '. f ,,
state. including the capacity to control behavior. ·with respect r 
not see why this should be so. \Vhy shoul d sentencing for bur-
glary, whi ch is his example, be more determinate rhan the semcnce 
for purposeful homicide? Although both have objecti ve harms, 
burglary is not divided into degrees, but why should th is matter? 
For example, in a prosecution for purposeful homicide, the state 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both killing conduct and 
the purpose to kill; in a burglary prosecution , the state must prove 
intentional breaking and entering with the intent to commit a fe l-
ony therein. In both cases of successful prosecution , the elements 
are established and the degree of prima facie guilt is determinate. 
Why shouldn't the sentence for both be equally determinate? If the 
implicit answer is that diminished responsibility affect s homicide 
culpability. the simple response is that it might equally affect bur-
glary culpability. Finally, if Professor Zimring is right that crimes 
divided into degrees based on variation in mens rea are particu-
larly unsuited to deterrninate sentencing, this would be true for 
adult killers as well. 
D. The Colculus ofluvenile Desert 
Professor Zimring rejects a straight discount from adult sen-· 
tences as a response to the assumed diminished responsibility of 
l 11 1 • 1 1" " d . -ado esccnts-so-ca.1eG "youtn mscounts -aw· proposes mste:aci 
an independent determination of the adolescent offender's aomo·· 
~ ... ! 
priate sentence. The thrust of the argument is once again not di-
rected at adolescents, however. Professor Zimring correctly notes 
that criminal sentences are " inexact, even crude rneasures of 
blameworthiness and variations in terms of confinement are only 
- 1 1 . . l 1 t" 1 b "j" ' '-, ) ' T'l ' roughly corre ateo w1tl1 teve_s o cu pa 11 1ty . . .. ~- i llUS. ne 
17 Zin1ring. supra note 1. at 461. 
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c lo. ims , usin g these penalties as base rates for di scounting treats an 
already crude system "as if it were a much more sensitive and ac-
curate measure of the commu nity' s sense of de served puni sh-
ment. ' '2> The problem. of course, is the initial crude ness of the 
penalty ~; t ructurc . Discounting does not trea t the c rude syste m as 
ITJ.ore !\~fined ~t n d sc n\itiv r: th~m it is. and it woul d not exacerb:Jte 
the probkrn; it wuulcl simply incorporate iL. The proper rcfonn is 
not speci al tre<:L l11CIH for adolescen ts, but change in the mcth od oC 
all culpability clctermination s a nd sentenci ng. 
Professor Z imring sugges ts that ind ividualized determinations 
are preferable for ado lescents because age is an incomplete proxy 
fo r diminished respons ibility24 and because vulnerabi lities assoc i-
ated with early and middle adolescents-especial1y susceptibility 
to peer pressure- explain some patterns of homic ide particularly 
well. Once again , the reach of the argument extends fa r past ado-
lescent homi cide. If diminished responsibility is a general miti-
gati ng condi tion. then some type of individualized determin at ion 
will always be necessary to determine the degree of diminution in 
any individual case, whether it is homicide or another crime and 
whether it is committed by an adult or by an adolescent. After all, 
the particular vulnerabilities ci ted would apply to crimes other 
than hom icide and would apply to some adults, too. To use Profes-
sor Zimring ' s example, imagine a passive adolescent who goes 
along w ith an armed robbery to make a positive impression and 
that the robbery does not turn le thal. The claim for diminished re-
sponsibility for armed robbery of the passive, vulnerable accom-
plice is as strong as it would be if the robbery causes death and re-
sults in a homicide prosecution. For another example, courts have 
recently been faced with claims of duress by battered women who 
were accomplices to the batterer' s crime. In many of these cases, 
standard duress conditions do not obtain, but there is surely a 
claim for d imin ished responsibility based on the accomplice' s vul-
nerability to pressu re fro m and desire to accommodate the barterer. 
Indeed, dependent ad ults may in general be more likely to be pas-
23 Id. 
24 Profc~~or 7:imrin g u . .;c:~ the word ··immaturity." but I assume t he~t this is a prox y for 
hi s more general mitiga ting condition. clim in ishecl res pon~ i b ili ty. Elsewhere he notes th :1t 
the range of var iation in responsibility among kids of the same age is "noto ri ously 
large. ·' Id. at 45S. 
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sivc accomplices. 
Professor Zimrin g concludes lhc discu ssion of the calculus oi 
desert by observing that straight discounting has not been used in 
the United States and Germany . He suggests that fa il ure to use thi s 
mechani sm for sen tenc in£:: to imp k mcnt dimini shed resoons ibllit\ 
.._ ' 1 ~ 
··shuulc! inspire caut i o n. · · ~:; [ clo ih' l thi nk, however, thal Pmf::sS\ ir 
Z imring me<-ms w im ply th at pres1.Ttl ju ve nil e sentenc ing pol ici\.> 
cllid pract ices in the United States are c\ success. Indeed , he opens 
his p<tper by sayin g that there is no adequate theory or practice in 
j uven il e sentencin g in gen era l or in homicide cases in particular. I 
believe that we have no adequate model of either discounting or 
the individualized determinations urged. The argument for indi-
vid uali zed de terminations would be more persuasive if it included 
a richer theory of d imini shed responsibility and ev idence that ju-
ries and judges would be abl e Lo apply it in a principled and even-
handed fashion. 
E. Constructive Doctrine mzd Adolescent Homicide Liability 
Professor Zimring next addresses a series of doctrines, in-
cluding felony murder, accesso rial liability and conspiracy, that he 
believes are especiall y relevant to adolescent homic ide and in their 
traditional form are no t appropriate for determining adolescent 
culpability .26 Group in vo lvement is more common in teen viol ence 
than at any other age. Ju st over half of adolescent killers did not 
::tct alone, whereas only about a quarter of adult kjllers acted with 
others .27 He does not describe similar data fo r other serious 
crimes, although it appears that in general adolescents are more 
likely to commit most crimes in groups. 28 One fifth of adolescent 
25 !d. at 463. 
26 Professor Zi mring neve r d irccrly addresses conspiratori al li ab ility. I will Jssume. 
however, that the arguments he makes abo ut accomplice li abi lity for adolescents could 
be mou nted equall y against conspiratorial liab il ity. Likewise, my response to hi s di sc u~ ­
sion of accomplice li abili ty app lies . with suitable modifi cations, to questi ons about con-
sp iracy. 
27 Z irming. supra note 1. at 464. 
2 ~ See Peter W. Greenwood. Di llcrences in Cri rni nal Behavior an cl Court Responses 
~rmu n g Ju venile ancl Youn g i\clult Ollcnde r:; , in 7 Crime and Ju stice: An Annual Revievi 
of Researc h 151, 156-1 57 ( Mich~re l Tunry & No rva! l'd orris eel s., 1986) (report ing , in ter 
alia . data from victim surveys indicat ing that juven iles comm it robbery in groups twice 
as o ften ::rs ad ults ancl from an arres t rccor·cJ ~t ud y de monstrat ing that seventy-seve n pe1·-
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homicides are felony murders, but we arc not g1 vcn the rate of 
··1rh , 1• Felo· n v Inurrle- r c.~ ..._ .. _l l- .. ~ _l J l ./ - u • 
P n ·)fe,·s··,r 7 ;l.'l l'l·l-IG '·lJ'ULt e " 1'-;t.S'L th •tt 'Lt· .-,r! iti·,., 1l ' Ll c!r·J·'fJ· ; n,··c O t. ' l " -1 .. , l..- . '1.\.JI ~J 1 ;::: (. c .. ,:) l ... Jk!.• Lt ..... ~ \.J I L .... _ L .._, • .__. , ") ,_ \._.. 
•" '• !.1'11"Ji ie >' I;•J'Qi kV '\ r~• iJ'lriJ.''!tl'l!'lV !.ll"')')''()l'}f;',i\' t'' )'' Cl<' 1<']'] 1 ll.'l]. jl 0 .. ... '·--' - .t - ! ,_, ~-- • ! t. ' ! .._ .I ( . • \_., (._ ... \.... .... (. .) • (l! ! .1 r- l l..l '· - \.. 1 ··~ L "" I I ~ :::::: 
ti·1~:: : : ~dTJab ilit v of ~;.ck) lesc ent s beca u ~ \:: accc'nlo lice li ahili tv is 
• ... t "" 
l:.lr~_:eiy b ~l scci on su bjec tive factors. bc ~:a tL .. ; ~~ the r ~tn~~ "'~ :_)r c_. u1p ~thll-· 
; -;- ,; ;-·{, r· : ·l c1 o 1 t·H" · (~ ::"r' r ~ .. l ('('() qleli,· f · "· t"' 1 t r) ~ -r; ,-. i , · i- -·- i~ l· ~r o~-~ ·~ ·-~~ i l .... c .. ,~ . 1 1 'S (' tl _· t• , d .1. 1 .... ,) ,_. \....- 1L r__ ._, _ __ • • ';:_ ) . :, _,.....,,, \.. ! l •_ l ll 'v i.,.. l._.., , ,(~ ::::: • ..... . r... t • .._t 1 .- \ ... d ... d, ._,. 
the culpabi li ty at the ·'Jow end of th e se ri o u s n ~:~ s cb :.rihution 
,. l>·,r ·l] id [j p l··•IJ-., ·. 1· "1.,...''11) ' ' 29 ·f.-.l;f' <:.!! Cl <rec: ·lc •Ll-' '"[. '1(.[0 1 ~'"(' e J··t :\ Ct' <)J ' ln]l: l't'S. ,J J.•_} ~ \~ _ '-" CJ. ~ _ l ._.. ~) lJ( • _, u'o.. o:::-:::::.._ · ~) •.J ,(J. (_~ 1\....,)._. 1 1 .... - .\. J 1 -' - _, _ ., 
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dant kne\v of and encouraged the use of le thal force . I agree with 
all of thi s, but it is true for adults and for less seri ous crimes by 
adol escents. American criminal law does not in gen eral distingu ish 
among accomplices in proportion to the importance or the role an 
accomplice played in the crime, but this is an object ion to Ameri-
can law generally and it applies with equal force to adult prosecu-
tions. The passive or "small fry" accompl ice or conspirator should 
not be treated as severely as the active accomplice. Indeed, other 
!ega! systems do grade an accomplice 's culpability and punish-
ment according to the degree of the accomplice's part icipati on.3° 
Fina ll y, the degree of involvement that would distinguish the 
culpabili ty of accomplices is not based primarily on subjective 
factors , as Professor Zimring suggests. but on the actual aid ren-
clerecL Accomplice liability requires that the defendant intended to 
promote or facilitate the crime, so all accomplices meet this sub-
jective, mens rea requirement. The degree of the accomplice's 
enthusiasm is not an element of the crime. The primary way ac-
complices indicate their intensity of participation is in the aid they 
render. The accomplice who holds the victim of a savage beating 
is di fferent from the accompl ice who pass ively stands by, implic-
itly offering encouragement. It is possi ble, of course , tha t some 
vv l10 aid more actively might be less enth usias tic and vice versa, 
but surely these are less common possibi lities. 
Pmfessor Zimring next makes the very interest ing suggestion 
,~·.: nr of .)i\t•: cn - ~: nd scvenlcc n-ycar-olds and sixty-si.\ perce nt nf eigh teen - and nin c: tccn-
ye:.:Hli ds robbed in groups) . 
~ 9 Zimring. supra note I, at 464 . 
·'0 C:l·orgc P. Fl eLe her. Rethinkin g Crimin :ll Law 650 ( 1978). 
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th at ~1do le scents should not be guilty of felon y murckr. even if 
the ir bt: h<.t vic r sat isfies all the elements of an underl yi i~ g fo rci ble 
felony th at i:-; the predicate for strict li ability fo r homi cide. He 
" '"' ' ' '' ': 1 ~ -L l ''"'' ,. ·ll ' ' t S 'LT J. r t J,t. cl1J i li t' 1 fo r t'.-' 10 1'' ' l11'LJ1"1"'r I. S ;LI ~· t l· r ; . lh ! ·' ,, .l, ]y\· ·"~ t.J\,.,\_ ...._ . 1 •. 1- -·"' l (l ~ '- • - - 1 (_ l ~ .. ) ... ....- 1 ~ • ) ,_, - .... J. \.... .• J .) l t•- ·- -_,\...... .... ., · -
;r ihr-:-. r ~,f! ':.:-. p : ·l ~·· r ; ,_. 1c11ll v C"L i 1 r~ 8. b1 e f,v·· 1·· lh:-=... 11~! <d P 1· ·] ~\-' i r1· o- CJff o?J·'"";f:".!. , i 1.t..-.• ·--· 1 ' -· ~ ~. L \... . ~ - ! ... t. ) _. t· - - """ •- -'''-· '-••- .,._.. -..., . :::: . .. \ . ...- .. ._) 1 _.. , 
-:t :: : \ syn1 p::tthct ic· tc: thi ~ c } (li l ·; ·l ~ l·';ut "it :Jpp l ii::~ ~(jU~l t l :'/ t<; 
:_lci~li : :.; _ >--i~tny ~-:. clt ll t::: ~l rc not fully cu ip ~~b l ;: bcc ~ ~i. ~ St:~ the '/:- L C)C} ~ ~~~uft·':: ~~ 
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~ipplv tu adolescents. but dimini shed responsi bil ity for an y reason 
stili uncknnines culpability. If Prcfessor Zim r ing'~; argum.crH is 
sound , it clearly generali zes. It also proves, bmvever, that hi s con-
cept of dimini shed responsibility applies equally to crimes other 
than homicide. If strict liability felony murder should not apply to 
ad c; icscents because they arc not full y cu lpable fo r the underlying 
fo rcibie fe lony, then they should not be held t'ul ly responsible fo r 
underlyin g forcible felonies that do not cause death. 
Professor Zirnring concludes his di sc ussion of felony murder 
by sugges ting that if transfer to criminal court is restricted to cases 
th;tt are mora1l y equivalent to intentional homicide, then transfer 
should occ ur only if an accomplice to the felony acti vely sup-
ported and participated in the acts that caused death. This argu-
ment, too, generali zes, and in its broades t form , it generalizes to 
perpet rators as well as to accomplices. If felon y murder is to be 
re tained at all, it ought to be applied only ro adolescent and ad ult 
accompli ces who actively participated in the acts causing death or 
vv ho knew that the perpetrator was carrying a leth al weapon or the 
like. Otherwise, strict li ability is especially di sproportionate. In-
deed, some states have incorporated such fair rules into their penal 
(~ode .:; 1 More important and more generally, felony murder is a 
moral abomination that should be abolished. Strict liability for 
hornicide is entirely unju st ified ; the prosecution should be forced 
to prove homicide liability directly for perpetrators and accom-
pli ces ali ke when a death occurs in the perpetration or attempt to 
-~ i E.g .. N.Y. Penal La\v ~ 125 .2.5 .3( a) -( d) (Ivlc 1(inney 1997) \( i"C ~I t in g dll atTi rn1:. tti ve 
lkfl'l1 'e to fe lony murder i!' th e agent die! not co mmit or encuuragc the homi cide. wa:; 11 l1t 
~: rmed. had no reasonable gmund to be ii eve that another parti cipa nt was armed, ~m e! had 
no re a-;u nabl .. :: gmuntl to be li eve that another parti c ip~tnt intcndccl to en g<:gc in co ilduct 
!;~ e l y tu re:;ult in death or serious physical injury). 
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perpet rate a felony. 
In surTL Professor Zimring ' s complaints abo ut the application 
of felony murcl<.;r. ~tccompiice liability , and conspiracy to ado les-
cents is reall y a complaint about the unfair extent to whi ch these 
l-[r•ct··;, l• 'S ;j ':F••;•'• ' ii· ;hi1j [ \1 0 CJ1P]''t[] v ,) ._ ! lll \...- . 1 •• ( · ' '·- - ·' "-' , _. .._, ,_ • .l ... ..} ;::.: ._. L J, 
F. Cu,n'ru! Punis/unt.::nr ond the !\do!c.\ccnr Kil ler 
V/e inhab it ct ncll ion in which over two-Lhirds of the sL.ttcs 
auth o ri ze capi tal punishment , and the Supreme Court has held that 
execut ing killers who killed when they were sixteen- and seven-
teen- years -old does not offend the Eighth Amendment. -' 2 Professor 
Zimrin g argues that age cannot be the relevant variable for why 
we draw the line at s ixteen; in stead , the notion of dimini shed cul-
pability fo r the crime is th e touchstone. Moreover, he be li eves that 
only the most blameworthy killers should be eligible for exec u-
tion. He is entirel y ri ght about all of this . Thus, jus tice requires 
that we establi sh the most thorough , convincing theory of respon-
sibility and mitigation. U nder many theories, young killers may in 
general be le ss blameworthy than adult killers, but these theories 
must be offered and supported. 
IV . PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
I have e lsewhere offered a full theory of responsibility and an 
analysis of its application to mid to late adolescent offenders.3-' In 
brief, I proposed that the general capacity to grasp and be guided 
by good reason, nonnative competence, is the most general con eli-
tion of responsibility. I included the capacities for empathy and 
guilt because they furnish the best reasons not to harm others. 
People who lack these capacities are not morally rational and are 
not members of the moral community. I then examined the psy-
32 Stanford v. Ken tucky. 492 U.S. 361, 380 ( 1989). Age may be considered as ~~ miti-
gat ing facror. howeve r. lei. at 7>75; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. S 15 , 838 
( 1988) (barrin g the e.\ec uti on of murclercrs who were less than si.\ teen- ycars-o ld when 
they ki ll ed): ~e c generally Ncmnan J. Finkel. Common sense Ju ::; ticc: Jurors· Notion ~ of 
the Law 2 I 2-:2 13 ( l <J9 5) (rc:porti ng that age has an i ndepenclen t effec t on the \Vi IIi ngness 
of subjects to impose the death penalty and th at age is in verse ly co rre l;ned with such im-
t?~si ti o n ) . 
. l.' See Morse . supra nu k 18. 
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chosocial data comparing adolescents to adults, none of which was 
derived from studies of the criminal conduct of either 2rouu. I 
~ L 
concluded that there are differences, but I also concluded that mu~~t 
of the variables that differentiate the groups are not funcbmental 
conditions of responsibility and that the curves of the grou 
f'l' 'l'l'l•tiJ F·('l' t"Y :t!1 l !']r' r' 't'lplrl · r' \"t. 'L'\' '' " Cl ''LlSC' e rJti'tJI.]J'!\i [ 1) !''''"' ; '1 >'! : '. , _. \ ...- l( _ . ,)1 ._ , \.. r ~l \,.....-- I _ t. ' ..., Lll l .) ._ t t.j '- r--' \... ·_.t ,!_ J 1 . ¥ 
~.:nee do no t :~ e,~Ill tu be excusing conditions gcnerali y and m,tny 
adults demonstrate these traits. In terms of responsibility, illli 'i t 
mid to late ctdolescents ~tppear to be like adults. And, if a rich 
normative theory indicates that the variables that differentiate 
adolescents should be considered mitigating or excusing conLli-
tions, then adults with these conditions should also be considered 
for mitigation or excuse. Only efficiency would justify failure to 
make individualized culpability determinations for adults. Finally, 
I speculated that there might be sufficiently substantial differences 
between adolescents and adults in the capacity for empathy to war-
rant a presumption of partial responsibility for adolescents. 
I agree with Professor Zimring that individualization of culpa-
bility for adolescent killers is very difficult, even when guided by 
a robust theory of responsibility and excuse. But, I believe that this 
is true for all criminals of any age. Indeed, as I have suggested 
throughout this Comment, many adult offenders suffer from the 
same deficits as adolescents and more. They, too, deserve incii-
vidualization , although it will be as hard to achieve in adult as in 
adolescent cases. 
As a result of the difficulties attending individualization, my 
preferred solution is adoption of a generic mitigating defense, par-
tial responsibility, based on the impaired capacity for rationality, 
that would apply to offenders of any age and to all crimes and that 
would be determined by the trier of fact. Thus, adolescents and 
adults alike might use diminished capacity for empathy, suscepti-
bility to peer pressure, or any other variable that our theory of re-
sponsibility suggested reduced culpability. Unlike Professor Zim-
ring, I would use a straight discounting approach to sentencing, 
reducing sentences in inverse relation to the seriousness of the 
crime charged. The inverse relation would be a means to balance 
culpability and public safety concerns. One grade of mitigation fo r 
every crime would fail to reflect finer culpability gradations, 
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treating quite diffe rent oCfcnders ::llikc. BuL g1ven the ep istemo-
1 • l J t • ' 1 1 > • . . . . 1 I • 1 • .og1ca. anc. norma 1ve proo ems oesc tung more precise ctLpaOiilty 
determin;::_tio n ~'· justice can demand no rnore: . and one grade of 
mitigati on \Vould avoid Ihe ineq uct! ity and arbit rariness that 'vvould 
·inevitably rc:~ ul t fron1 al1egecHy n1orc rcr-~n\4~ ci d~.~t crrnit! ~t tion s . 
:v.J goud the()ry and 
-. -~'1 -- ~ ~ ; , , -:-.. .: c • "'~ l · n ~ ., abl p fl· !4f~ "' T) 0P r.--1 -:-Q ·) --l ( j .~ , .-. ~.-• ~ · ' 7 !_ •. J·l1 '-" !~ ('- y-_} p ,-\i SQ [_; ial. .! l . C Lo c<Vct!H [..__ ~) ~ ~~ d'-..1 l •.tl. i }''··''- c..ll c 1\. , c; •'- l l ,, cL 
• '-,.1· -1 .-c t ho·- r •·J'"e"'' ,.""'t"· 1-.. : c- ,• •hi' ,,·,ne t r
1
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analvsis. I a~ree that thev raise di fficult issues. but I disagree that 
.I "--"' "" . ..._, 
they are any harder than the culpabil ity an alysis required for other 
adolescent offenders and for adults. Adolescent killers are ju st one 
hard case among a system rife with hard cases. What is needed is a 
complete. systematic theory of respons ibility and excuse to re-
spond lo all culpability determination ~;. Assess ing culpab ility wi1l 
st ill be hard for all criminals. but at leas t it wi ll be subj ect to 
greater rational control than now obtains . 
